ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

WORKERS' COMPENSATION EMPLOYEE COMPENSATED FOR HEART ATrACK SUFFERED DUE TO
ORDINARY

WORK

STRAIN

IN

EXCESS

OF

DAILY WEAR AND

TEAR-Heliwig v. J.F. Rast & Co., 110 NJ. 37, 538 A.2d 1243

(1988).
Workers' compensation laws were created to compensate
employees and their families for work-related injuries. From the
inception of the federal workers' compensation acts most states,
including New Jersey, had similar statutes which compensated
employees for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.2 The burden of proof was on the employer to show that
the employee's injury or death did not "arise out of" or was not
"in the course of his employment." ' This language has always
been construed liberally.4 For example, a pre-existing disease or
infirmity has never disqualified an employee's claim for benefits. 5
I 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1972); Cook, Workers'
Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 879, 881 (1986). "Workers' compensation has been termed the oldest of the American social insurance programs and equivalent in its results to a
species of insurance in favor of workmen." Id. The goal of these laws was to provide injured workers with payments under a fixed scheme without resort to litigation because proof of the employer's negligence was not required. Id.
2 See A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.30; Note, OccupationalDisease, Mental Stress and
House Bill 2271, 24 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 350 (1988). Forty-two state statutes use
the language "arising out of and in the course of employment" to describe the
required link between employment and disability. Cook, supra note 1, at 881-82
(citing A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.00, at 3-1 (1985)).
In theory, the required causal link was not the requirement of proximate cause but
a lesser standard. Id. at 882.
3 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959) (repealed) which provides:
When employer and employee shall by agreement ... accept the provisions of this article compensation for personal injuries to, or for the
death of, such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the
negligence of the employer .... and the burden of proof of such fact
shall be upon the employer.
Id.
4 See A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.00; Cook, supra note 1, at 881 (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935); Sole v.
Kindelberger, 91 W. Va. 603, 114 S.E. 151 (1922)).
5 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 12.20. Most, if not all, heart attacks stem from preexisting heart disease. P. BARTH, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED
ILLNESSES AND DISEASES (1980).
See, e.g., Canadian Gulf Line, Ltd. v. Shea, 404
F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1968) (employee's death from arteriosclerotic heart disease compensated under workers compensation statute when worry arising out of work-related injury contributed to employee's death); Schreven v. Indus. Comm'n, 96 Ariz.
143, 393 P.2d 150 (1964) (employee suffering from spinal injury, which eventually
would have caused disability, compensated when work-related accident aggravated
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If the conditions of employment had aggravated, accelerated, or
in any way contributed to the death or disability, compensation
was awarded. 6 Thus, the employer took the employee as he
found him.
New Jersey courts have had much difficulty interpreting
whether injuries actually arose out of or were in the course of
employment. 7 Thus, in 1979, the NewJersey Workers' Compensation Act (Statute) was amended to include specific new conditions for cardiovascular claims. The amended Statute requires
that the work strain causing the injury involve a substantial condition in excess of the claimant's daily routine activity. 8
The New Jersey Appellate Division in Prusecki v. Branch Motor
Express9 interpreted the amended Statute to require that the work
injury); McAllister v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 408, 445
P.2d 313, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968) (fact that fireman's own cigarette smoking may
have added to danger of contracting lung cancer was held immaterial since only
necessary to show that employment was contributing cause); Green v. Al Green
Enters., 73 N.J. Super. 132, 179 A.2d 151 (App. Div. 1962) (claimant with glandular
disability compensated for skin rash over entire body, rather than merely on exposed portions after coming in contact with cleaning products); Wexler v. Lambrecht Foods, 64 N.J. Super. 489, 166 A.2d 576 (App. Div. 1960) (claimant
compensated for a heart attack occurring during the course of his employment despite finding that attack was causally related to pre-existing heart disease); Lipscombe v. Loizeaux Lumber Co., 12 N.J. Super. 276, 79 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1951)
(claimant compensated for amputation of left leg due to arteriosclerotic condition
after sustaining injury to left foot, however, amputation of right leg six months later
not compensated because injury to left foot was not shown to have caused amputation of right leg).
6 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 12.20. Green, 73 N.J. Super. at 138-39, 179 A.2d
at 155; Wexler, 64 N.J. Super. at 500, 166 A.2d at 582.
7 See Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962) (work effort
has to be a substantial factor contributing to the heart attack); Ciuba v. Irvington
Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958) (claimant merely must
prove that the strain at work aggravated a pre-existing physical infirmity to establish
liability); Seiken v. Todd Dry Dock, 2 N.J. 469, 67 A.2d 131 (1949) (holding that
claimant must prove unusual exertion or strain beyond the employment itself to
establish liability); Prusecki v. Branch Motor Exp., 206 N.J. Super. 39, 501 A.2d 100
(App. Div. 1985) (work stress must exceed stress in routine home activity to be
compensable under Workers' Compensation statute).
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
In any claim for compensation for injury or death from cardiovascular
or cerebral vascular cases, the claimant shall prove by a preponderance
of the credible evidence that the injury or death was produced by the
work effort or strain involving a substantial condition, event or happening in excess of the wear and tear of the claimant's daily living and in
reasonable medical probability caused in a material degree the cardiovascular or cerebral vascular injury or death resulting therefrom. Material degree means an appreciable degree or a degree substantially
greater than de minimis. Id.
9 206 N.J. Super. 39, 501 A.2d 1006 (1985).
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strain, immediately prior to the employee's accident, exceed the
routine strain normally encountered by that employee at work.' 0
In a subsequent decision, however, the appellate division in
Heliwig v. J.F. Rast & Co. ," interpreted the Statute to require that
the work effort involve a substantial condition in excess of the
2
wear and tear of the claimant's daily living exclusive of work.,
Due to the inconsistent appellate division interpretations of the
Statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification 13 to
clarify the legislative intent in enacting the Statute.14
Thomas Hellwig was employed by J.F. Rast & Co. (Rast).' 5
On his first day back to work, following a seven-week layoff,16
Hellwig and a co-employee were assigned the task of repairing a
pasteurizer.' 7 The work involved climbing a ladder at steep angles and stooping under conveyor belts in over eighty-degree
heat and high humidity.'I In addition, Hellwig had to move over
300 pounds of welding machinery from the maintenance shop,
located on a lower level of the plant, to the pasteurizer.' 9
After taking a short break, Hellwig and his co-worker again
climbed the ladder and began work on the pasteurizer.2 0 Hellwig
subsequently climbed down the ladder to adjust the welder, but
never returned. 2 ' Co-workers found him lying unconscious on
the floor beneath the pasteurizer2 2 Hellwig later died and an au10 Id. at 49, 501 A.2d at 1011.
I 215 N.J. Super. 247, 521 A.2d 896 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 110 N.J. 37, 538
A.2d 1243 (1988).
12 215 N.J. Super. at 253, 521 A.2d at 898.
13 107 N.J. 636, 527 A.2d 459 (1987).
14 Hellwig v.J.F. Rast & Co., Inc., 110 N.J. 37, 39, 538 A.2d 1243, 1244 (1988).
15 215 N.J. Super. at 248, 521 A.2d at 896.
16 Id. During the layoff period Hellwig remained idle at home. Id. His only
activities were watching television, cutting the grass and going to the store. Id. at
247, 521 A.2d at 896. In the hopes of obtaining work, he occasionally reported to
the union hall. Id.
17 Id. at 248, 521 A.2d at 897. Repairing the pasteurizer was strenuous because
it was located at an upper level of the plant. Id. at 249, 521 A.2d at 897.
18 Id. Hellwig and his co-worker had to lift fifty-pound steel doors over their
heads from cramped positions because of the conveyors overhead. Id. The appellate court noted that decedent died in the summer, on July 31, 1983, and that his
home and car were air conditioned. Id.
19 Id. The welding equipment included a large bottle of gas and a substantial
quantity of welding lead which had to be moved to the pasteurizer area by pushing
and pulling it under the conveyors. Id. Two trips were necessary to move the lead
from the maintenance department to the elevator. Id.
20 Id. The ladder, placed at a seventy degree angle, separated the pasteurizer
from the welder. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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topsy revealed that the cause of death was a heart attack.23
The compensation judge granted Mrs. Hellwig's claim for
dependency benefits, finding that the decedent's work effort was
"strenuous and in excess of the wear and tear of [the claimant's]
daily living." ' 24 Consequently, the judge concluded that the work
effort was a substantial cause of Hellwig's heart attack as required
by the Statute.2 5
Rast appealed the award of benefits contending that to obtain dependency benefits the claimant must prove that the work
effort which induced the heart attack was in excess of those
stresses normally encountered at work or at home. 26 Additionally, Rast asserted that the judge committed reversible error by
refusing to consider the type of work Hellwig performed at the
plant prior to his layoff. 2 7 Although the appellate division agreed
that the record was void of any evidence of the rigors of the prior
work effort of the defendant, it affirmed the compensation
judge's decision. 28 The appellate division disagreed with the
Prusecki court's interpretation of section 34:15-7.2 of the New
Jersey Statutes and held that the legislature only intended to require that the heart attack be caused by "the work effort or strain
involving a substantial condition in excess of the 'wear and tear
of the claimant's daily living' exclusive of work." ' 29 The supreme
23 Id. at 249-50, 521 A.2d 897.
24 Id. at 250, 521 A.2d at 897.
25 Id. Both plaintiff and defendant called expert witnesses to determine the
cause of death. Id. Defendant's expert testified that the death was caused from
"fatal ventricular fibrillation" which was the inevitable result of Hellwig's coronary
artery disease. Id. However, the judge accepted the opinion of plaintiff's expert
that Hellwig died from a heart attack due to the increase in work effort. Id. at 24950, 521 A.2d at 897.
26 Id. at 251, 521 A.2d at 898. See Prusecki v. Branch Motor Express, 206 N.J.
Super. at 49, 501 A.2d at 1011. For a more complete discussion of Prusecki see infra
notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
27 Hellwig, 110 N.J. at 251, 521 A.2d at 898. The compensation judge determined a consideration of prior work effort was irrelevant under the statute. Id.
28 Id.

29 Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2) (emphasis added). The appellate
division noted that the language of the original proposed amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act in 1978 required work effort in excess of the routine duties
of one's employment. Id. at 252, 521 A.2d at 898-99. However, the court noted
the adopted language of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2 simply requires work effort
greater than the wear and tear of claimant's daily living. Hellwig, 215 N.J. Super. at
252, 521 A.2d at 898. The court also cited to the JOINT STATEMENT TO SENATE
COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE, No. 802 and ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE SUBSTITUTE FOR ASSEMBLY, No. 840, [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT] stating that the pur-

pose of the legislation was to counter the effects of the Dwyer decision. Hellwig, 215
N.J. Super. at 252, 521 A.2d at 898-99. The Dwyer court ruled that the claimant
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court affirmed the lower court's decision in Heliwig, holding that
the claimant established that the work effort sufficiently caused
the death.3" The supreme court based its decision upon a trilogy
of workers' compensation cases involving coronary disease, together with its interpretation of the legislative intent of section
34:15-7.2 of the NewJersey Statutes.'
The first in this trilogy of cases was Seiken v. Todd Dry Dock.3 2
In Seiken, the petitioner was employed as a laborer in a shipyard.3 3 While at work, performing his usual duties, the petitioner
and a co-worker were lifting a 250-pound piece of scrap metal
onto a truck when petitioner suffered chest pains and shortness
of breath.3 4 Shortly thereafter, the petitioner collapsed.3 5 He
was examined by the plant physician who found his heart in satisfactory condition and advised him to see his own doctor.3 6 The
petitioner's physician diagnosed him as having coronary thrombosis and admitted him to the hospital.3 7 Subsequently, he suffered multiple heart attacks and was unable to work.3 8 The New
Jersey Supreme Court determined that the petitioner failed to establish the statutory prerequisites 39 to prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence.40 After reviewing prior
must prove that the ordinary work effort probably contributed substantially to the
acceleration of the existing heart disease and death. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36
N.J. 487, 493, 178 A.2d 161, 164. In affirming the compensation judge's decision
in Hellwig, Judge Stern, in concurrence, emphasized that the conflict between
He//wig and Prusecki constituted express grounds for certification to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. He//wig, 215 N.J. Super. at 255, 521 A.2d at 900 (Stern, J.,
concurring).
30 See He//wig, 110 N.J. at 55, 538 A.2d 1253. In addition, the supreme court also
noted the importance of the testimony of medical experts to determine the causal
relations between work effort and heart failure. Id. at 52-54, 538 A.2d 1252-53. See
also supra note 7.
31 He//wig, 110 N.J. at 42-51, 538 A.2d at 1246-51.
32 2 N.J. 469, 67 A.2d 131 (1949).
33 Id. at 472, 67 A.2d at 132.
34 Id. at 473, 67 A.2d at 132.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id., 67 A.2d at 132-33.
38 Id., 67 A.2d at 133.
39 Id. at 474, 67 A.2d at 133. In 1949, the applicable statute establishing a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act required that the alleged
injury arise in the course of employment. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (West 1959)
(repealed). For a more complete version of the requirements for compensability
under the Act see supra, note 3.
40 Id. at 474-75, 67 A.2d at 133 (citing Parker v. John A. Roebling's Sons Co.,
135 N.J.L. 440, 52 A.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1947)). The preponderance of the evidence
standard stems from the presumption that heart disease is a result of natural
causes. Id. Thus, the petitioner has the burden of proving that his employment
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workers' compensation case law, the court concluded that the
claimant must prove unusual exertion or strain beyond that of
mere employment to establish liability.4" The court concluded
that the petitioner failed to meet the test of proving that his heart
attack occurred due to unusual exertion or strain beyond that of
his employment.4 2
The interpretation of section 34:15-7.2 of the New Jersey
Statutes formulated in Seiken, namely the "unusual strain" standard, was expressly overruled in the second case of the trilogy,
Cuiba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulator Co. 4 3 The Cuiba court held
that if the strain at work aggravated a pre-existing physical infirmity, the resulting injury is compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act. 44 The employee in Cuiba was employed as a
millwright for over fifteen years.45 The very nature of the job
involved varying degrees of exertion due to the weight and
dimensions of the machinery.46 The claimant suffered a fatal
heart attack shortly after installing an oven drive shaft unit
weighing approximately 250 pounds.4 7
In denying the employee benefits, the deputy director of the
Workers' Compensation Board concluded that the heart attack
was most probably the natural result of progressive heart disease
and not an incident of his employment.48 The county court afwas a factor without which the injury would not have occurred. Id. at 475, 67 A.2d
at 133 (citing Ames v. Sheffield Farms Co., 137 N.J.L. 336, 59 A.2d 811 (1948),
aff'd, 1 N.J. 11, 12, 61 A.2d 502 (1948); Lohndorf v. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 134
N.J.L. 156, 159, 46 A.2d 439, 440 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 135 N.J.L. 352, 52 A.2d 61
(1946), Grassgreen v. Ridgeley Sportswear Mfg. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 62, 72, 64 A.2d
616, 621 (App. Div. 1949);Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. v. Law, 135 N.J.L. 528, 531,
53 A.2d 215, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1947)).
41 Seiken, 2 N.J. at 476, 67 A.2d at 134. See Grassgreen v. Ridgeley Sportswear
Mfg. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 62, 64 A.2d 616 (denying workers' compensation benefits to
employee who suffered seizure while sorting fifty-pound bundles of cloth during his
routine work duties); Ames v. Sheffield Farms Co., 1 N.J. 11, 61 A.2d 502 (denying
benefits to milk driver who suffered fatal heart attack while driving milk truck on
usual route); Lohndorfv. Peper Bros. Paint Co., 134 N.J.L. 156, 46 A.2d 439 (denying benefits to paint store manager for heart attack suffered after moving one hundred-pound can of paint).
42 Seiken, 2 N.J. at 477, 67 A.2d at 134.
43 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).
44 Id. at 136, 141 A.2d at 765.
45 Id. at 132, 141 A.2d at 763. A millwright usually worked with a group of
workers who maintained machinery throughout the plant. Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 131, 141 A.2d at 763. The work was done in an area two feet wide with

an eight or nine foot ceiling above the work level. Id. at 133, 141 A.2d at 764. The
temperature in the work area was thirty degrees higher than outside. Id.
48 Id. at 131, 141 A.2d at 763. Evidence showed that one of decedent's doctors
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firmed the director on the grounds set out in Seiken.49 The
supreme court found that the events which occurred in Cuiba
constituted a compensable injury within section 34:15-7.2 of the
New Jersey Statutes. 50 According to the court, the work strain
accelerated the progress of a pre-existing heart condition and
was therefore a contributing factor in the death. 51 The court

posited that whether or not the work strain was in excess of that
customarily performed by the employee was not relevant.52 To
support this contention, the Cuiba court relied on early English
decisions holding that ordinary work effort could lead to a compensable accident.53 While the Cuiba court overruled Seiken on
the issue of work effort, the court reaffirmed Seiken's holding that
the claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the work effort was a contributing factor in the injury or death.54 Consequently, the majority noted that " 'reasonable probability' is the standard of persuasion.

'5 5

Although the

court stated that circumstantial or presumptive evidence may be
produced to demonstrate that the offered hypothesis is a rational
inference, it stressed that the reasonable probability standard requires evidence sufficient for the reasonable person to believe
that the tendered hypothesis is the fact. 56
Thereafter, in Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co. ,57 the last of the trilogy, this standard was again evaluated and affirmed.58 The decedent in Dwyer was a forty-one-year-old laborer employed at the
diagnosed his condition as angina pectoris fifteen years earlier. Id. at 133, 141 A.2d
at 764.
49 Id. at 131, 141 A.2d at 763. The county court found that the work effort was
not more strenuous than the work for which the employee was hired and which he
customarily performed. Id.
50 Id. at 134-35, 141 A.2d at 764-65.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 136, 141 A.2d at 765.
53 Id. (citing Clover, Clayton & Co., Ltd. v. Hughes (1910) A.C. 242, workman
compensated for rupture of an advanced aneurism of the aorta while tightening nut
with spanner). The Ciuba court determined the death was caused by ordinary work
effort even though the aneurism was so advanced that anything could have brought
about its rupture. Id.
54 Id. at 138, 141 A.2d at 766-67. Cf.Ames v. Sheffield Farms Co., 137 N.J.L.
336, 59 A.2d 811 (1948), aft'd, 1 N.J. 11, 61 A.2d 502 (1948); Lohndorf v. Peper
Bros. Paint Co., 134 N.J.L. 156, 46 A.2d 439 (1946), aff'd, 135 N.J.L. 352, 52 A.2d
61 (1946); Grassgreen v. Ridgeley Sportswear Mfg. Co., 2 N.J. Super. 62, 64 A.2d
616 (App. Div. 1949); and Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. v. Law, 135 N.J.L. 528, 53
A.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
55 Ciuba, 27 N.J. at 139, 141 A.2d at 767.
56 Id. at 139-40, 141 A.2d at 767.
57 36 N.J. 487, 178 A.2d 161 (1962).
58 Id.
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Ford Motor factory. 59 After experiencing chest pains, he was diagnosed as having rheumatoid arthritis and angina pectoris, 60
and was accordingly hospitalized for a month. 6 Fourteen
months after his release from the hospital, Dwyer again complained of chest pains. 62 At that time his doctor prescribed nitroglycerin pills and advised him that he could return to work.6 3
Accordingly, Dwyer returned to work and performed his usual
duties, although sluggishly. 64 However, shortly thereafter Dwyer
died from an "acute coronary occlusion with posterior wall
65
infarction."
The application for benefits on behalf of Dwyer was denied
by both the Division of Workers' Compensation and the appellate court.6 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, reversed
and held that the work effort must have been a substantial factor
contributing to the heart attack before benefits could be
awarded. 67 According to Dwyer, the worker seeking compensation benefits must prove by a preponderance of credible evidence
that the work effort contributed to the heart attack in a material
way. 68 The court emphasized that the claimants must prove that
Id. at 498, 178 A.2d at 166.
Id. The attending physician listed decedent's ailments in order of importance
with angina pectoris being last on the list. Id. In addition, the doctor noted that
decedent's anginal pains were typical and could be promptly relieved by nitroglycerin. Id.
61 Id., 178 A.2d at 166-67.
62 Id. at 499, 178 A.2d at 167. The decedent's expert testified that at this time
the decedent suffered an attack of acute coronary insufficiency which thereafter
continued until his death. Id. at 503, 178 A.2d at 169.
63 Id. at 500, 178 A.2d at 167. The doctor testified at trial that he told decedent
only to perform light duties at work and advised the decedent against heavy lifting.
Id.
64 Id. One of decedents co-workers testified that decedent had trouble carrying
on his work and that decedent looked white and strained. Id. The co-worker further testified that this was unusual given decedent's past performance at work. Id.
at 501, 178 A.2d at 168.
65 Id. at 502, 178 A.2d at 168-69. Both medical experts agreed with the "basic
medical principle that stress or strain can be a contributory factor in the aggravation of an existing coronary insufficiency." Id. However, Dwyer's expert testified
that the cumulative effect of decedent's repeated exertion increased the extent of
the coronary insufficiency and was a substantial contributing factor in producing his
heart failure. Id. at 504, 178 A.2d at 169-70. Ford's expert testified to the contrary,
stating "there must be a stress or strain incident just prior to the onset of his initial
symptom which is usually pain" in order for a causal connection to exist. Id. at 504,
178 A.2d at 171.
66 Id. at 491, 178 A.2d at 163.
67 Id. at 506-07, 178 A.2d at 171.
68 Id. The court also noted that the probability of duplicating work stress in
routine activity is irrelevant. Id. at 509, 178 A.2d at 172. Only exertion encoun59
60
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the work effort was of an appreciable degree, a degree greater
than de minimis, and that the work was capable of contributing to
the heart attack. 69 Accordingly, the court emphasized that the
mere assertion of a reasonably probable connection between the
work strain and heart attack is not enough.70 Therefore, the
court concluded that such evidence must be evaluated in its totality and considered in light of the medical opinions offered.7"
In finding that the petitioner met the preponderance of the
evidence standard,7 2 the court determined that the events which
occurred over the last hours of the decedent's life were indicative
of the damaging effect of physical strain on an ailing heart.7 3 The
court noted that proof of one specific incident of work stress is
not essential if it is determined that the totality of the decedent's
work effort contributed to the heart attack. 4 In addition, the
court held that whether or not the work stress could be duplicated in routine home activity is irrelevant in awarding workers'
compensation benefits.7 5
In light of the holdings enunciated in the foregoing trilogy
of cases, the legislature, in 1979, amended section 34:15-7.2 of
the New Jersey Statutes to include a "wear and tear" clause and 76a
"substantial condition" in excess of daily living requirement.
Subsequent courts interpreted the new Statute literally, barring
compensation unless the claimant could prove that his work
strain was unusual and in excess of strain regularly encountered
tered at work can be considered when determining contributing factors. Id. The
degree of a claimant's previously impaired heart condition is of no consequence.
Id.
69 Id. at 493-94, 178 A.2d at 164.
70 Id. at 494, 178 A.2d at 165.
71 Id. at 495, 178 A.2d at 165.
72 Id. at 512-13, 178 A.2d at 174. For recitation of expert testimony concerning
causation of death, see id. at 502-505, 178 A.2d. 169-70.
73 Id. at 508, 178 A.2d 172. The court found the testimony of decedent's coworkers on his performance that day at work consistent with the testimony of decedent's expert. Id. The co-workers noted that decedent seemed ill in the morning
and looked worse later in the day. Id. Co-workers further commented that decedent failed to eat during the break and that he took a number of pills. Id. at 501,
178 A.2d 171. These facts are consistent with decedent's complaints upon admission to the hospital. Id. Decedent complained of severe precardial pains which began approximately three hours earlier, while he was still at work. Id. at 502, 178
A.2d at 169.
74 Id. at 494, 178 A.2d at 164. This was the opinion of Dwyer's expert which the
court accepted.
75 Id. at 509, 178 A.2d at 172.
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-7.2 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
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in routine home activity. 77 The recognized purpose of the new
' 78
amendment was "to counter the far-reaching effects of Dwyer.
In sum, courts awarded benefits if the claimant could prove that
the heart attack was the result ofjob-related work strain in excess
79
of the petitioner's daily living.

The court in Prusecki v. Branch Motor Express,80 reversed a rul-

ing which awarded benefits to an employee who suffered a heart
attack because he failed to prove that the work strain exceeded
the wear and tear of his daily life.8" The claimant, a fifty-threeyear-old forklift operator was a heavy smoker.8" He had no history of heart trouble, but suffered a heart attack shortly after a
strenuous day at work.83 The court agreed with the petitioner's
expert that the heart attack was caused by work strain, but found
insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
the work strain exceeded the stress of his routine home activity.84
Interestingly, in a case with similar facts, the trial court in
Essex County, in an unpublished opinion, refused to award benefits to a widow for a fatal heart attack her husband suffered while

working as a bricklayer.85 The court in Bubulka v. Truesdale Constr.
77 See Perno v. Ornstein Fashions Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 174, 481 A.2d 1166 (App.
Div. 1984) (holding that an employee in a sewing factory could not collect benefits
because she failed to prove work strain exceeded daily routine activity). See also
Prusecki v. Branch Motor Express, 206 N.J. Super. 39, 501 A.2d 1006 (App. Div.
1985) (holding that forklift operator failed to establish that work effort exceeded
routine daily stress of strain requirement).
78 Perno at 175, 481 A.2d at 1167 (citing JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 29).
79 See Prusecki, 206 N.J. Super. at 45, 501 A.2d at 1009.
80 206 N.J. Super. 39, 501 A.2d 1006.
81 Id. at 42, 501 A.2d at 1007.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 41, 501 A.2d at 1007, claimant spent most of his shift unloading heavy
freight from a trailer. Id. A portion of the trailer was blocked by a large crate. Id.
This crate forced the claimant to manually unload the freight by climbing over the
obstruction. Id. Normally this work was done by a machine, but because of the
circumstances it had to be done by hand. Id. Claimant asked for assistance at the
beginning of his shift, but no help was sent until his shift was almost over. Id.
Prusecki began to sweat heavily before his break at 6:00 a.m. Id. at 42, 501 A.2d at
1007. During his break he ate and laid down for half an hour. Id. He felt dizzy and
complained of pain in his elbows. Id. He returned to work for another hour and a
half before co-workers took him to the hospital. Id.
84 Id. at 48, 501 A.2d at 1011. Thus, the case was remanded for further findings
of fact. Id. at 50, 501 A.2d at 1012.
85 See Bubulka v. Truesdale Constr. Corp., CP 81-894 (Workers Compensation
Division, January 10, 1984). Decedent was "bricking up" a doorway near a truck
tunnel at the mall in Short Hills. Id. at 3, 4. The job involved climbing a ladder to
get onto a small scaffold. Once on the scaffold, decedent cut and trimmed tenpound cement blocks to fit into the doorway. Id. Much of this work was done from
a squatting, bent-over position. Id.
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Corp. ,86 interpreted the statute consistently with Prusecki.8 7 The

rationale for the denial of benefits rested on four factors: the absence of complaints or visible signs of distress by the decedent
on the day of his death; the short time between his lunch break
and his collapse; the absence of certain medical evidence supporting claimant's expert's theory of death; and undisputed expert testimony that decedent's work efforts were not in excess of
his routine daily activity.8 8 The Bubulka court interpreted the
amendment to section 34:15-7.2 of the New Jersey Statutes as
severely restricting the dicta set out in Dwyer.s9
Consequently, the court in Perno v. Ornstein Fashions,9" denied
benefits because the claimant failed to prove that the stress at
work was abnormal or involved a "substantial condition, event or
happening" which probably caused the injury. 9 ' Once again, the
court literally interpreted the language of the 1979 amended
Statute. The claimant in Perno, a sewing machine operator, had a
pre-existing heart condition and on the day of the injury her
work effort was no greater than usual.9 2 The court found "no
Id.
Id. The Bubulka court, in examining the legislative history of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:15-7.2 and the original Senate Bill No. 802, reasoned that "the Legislature
intended not only to reject a requirement that compensability be based on unusual
work effort or strain, but that 'daily living' was not to be equated with 'daily livelihood.' " Bubulka at 28.
88 Id. at 25-27. The court noted that there was testimony at trial that decedent
felt fine in the morning on the date of his death. Id. at 3. Also, the proofs indicated
that decedent had a lunch break from 11:55 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and that decedent
collapsed between 12:40 and 1:00 p.m. Id. The court particularly emphasized that
decedent only moved two to three bricks between his lunch break and his collapse.
Id. at 4. Thus the work effort was not strenuous. Id.
Finally, there was undisputed testimony that the decedent's work effort was
equivalent to walking three miles per hour. Id. at 8. Thus, the court concluded that
the decedent's work effort was not in excess of his routine daily activity. Id. at 2527.
89 Id. at 28-30.
90 196 N.J. Super. 174, 481 A.2d 1166 (App. Div. 1984).
91 Id. at 179, 481 A.2d 1169 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2). See also supra
note 77.
92 Perno, 196 N.J. Super. at 177, 481 A.2d 1168. The claimant in Perno was a
fifty-six-year-old woman with forty years of experience as a sewing machine operator. Id. She said her job required her to carry large bundles of fabric to her station,
three or four times a day and that this was strenuous for her. Id. She alleged that
this work effort contributed to her existing heart disease. Id. Claimant had been
experiencing angina and taking nitroglycerin pills for close to five years before she
began her job with the defendant company.. Id. One day at work she complained of
chest pains and was sent home. Id. After seeing her doctor, she was hospitalized for
a week and discharged with a final diagnosis of "chest pains of undetermined etiology possible angina pectoris, urinary tract infection, anxiety and exogenous obesity." Id. Claimant did not return to work. Id. Petitioner's expert testified at trial
86
87
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triggering event from either normal or excessively abnormal
work related activity" which caused the attack.93 The Perno court
opined that the heart attack was the inevitable result of the claimant's existing heart condition and that it was merely a coincidence that the attack occurred at work.9 4 The court denied
workers' compensation benefits. 95
Thus, the courts in both Prusecki and Perno interpreted the
"substantial strain" requirement literally to mean in excess of
normal work strain at the employee's job.9 6 The "job-related in a
material degree" clause was also interpreted literally.97 The denial of workers' compensation benefits in these cases was in direct conflict with the legislature's purpose in amending section
34:15-7.2 of the New Jersey Statutes in 1979.98 These decisions
did not counter the far-reaching effects of Dwyer, but rather suggested a revival of the Seiken standard requiring proof of unusual
effort or strain, in excess of the work normally performed by the
employee.99 Thus, the supreme court in Heliwig v. J.F. Rast &
Co.'o° overruled these literal interpretations of the Workers'
Compensation Statute and held that ordinary work effort may
lead to a compensable injury. 01
The Heliwig court initially traced the evolution of workers'
compensation cases from Seiken to Prusecki as well as the amendthat her work effort aggravated her underlying heart condition. Id. The compensation judge allowed seven and one-half percent of total permanent disability award
to pay for the week's treatment at the hospital, as well as eight weeks of temporary
disability. Id. at 149, 481 A.2d at 1169. Thejudge determined claimant could have
returned to work. Id.
The appellate division reversed finding that at best, "petitioner suffered a transitory angina episode coincident to her longstanding, underlying disease process."
Id. The appellate court found nothing to satisfy the requirements of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-7.2. Id. See also supra note 77.
93 Pe-no, 196 N.J. Super. at 180, 481 A.2d 1170. The proofs made clear that
petitioner had a history of progressive and degenerative heart disease. Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
98 See supra note 32.
99 Hellwig, 110 N.J. at 50, 538 A.2d at 1251. More support for this contention
may be found in the unpublished opinion of Yalcin v. Airtron Division of Litton
Indus., C.P. 83-24434 (N.J. Div. of Workers' Comp., March 16, 1987). In Yalcin, the
court expressly rejected the Prusecki wear and tear rationale labeling it a revision to
the reasoning of the appellate division in Hellwig. Id. The Yalcin court adopted the
appellate division's rationale in Hellwig and awarded benefits to a machinist who
suffered a myocardial infarction while on the job. Id.
1oo 110 N.J. 37, 538 A,2d 1243 (1988).
101 Id.
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ments to the New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act. 10 2 More
specifically, the supreme court compared the standards set out in
Dwyer with the language of the 1979 amendment to section
34:15-7.2 of the New Jersey Statutes to determine the legislature's true intent. 0 3 The Heliwig court noted that the amended
Statute required "work effort or strain in excess of the wear and
tear of claimant's daily living."' 0 4 The court recognized that this
was a substantial change from the dicta in Dwyer which purported
the irrelevancy of duplicating work stress and strain in routine
home activity. 10 5 Thus, in accordance with the language of the
new Statute, the court pointed out that the claimant in Heliwig
lived in an air conditioned home and drove an air conditioned
car. 10 6 He did not exercise routinely and had been especially immobile due to the seven-week layoff from work. 10 7 Thus, any
stress or strain at work would be in excess of that found in his
routine home activity.108
The Heliwig court found another modification of Dwyer in the
amendment to the Statute, namely the redefining of "material
degree."' 0 9 According to the statute, "material degree" means
"an appreciable degree or a degree substantially greater than de
minimis.,"11o Examining the change in language used in the Statute the court was persuaded that the legislature intended to decrease the quantum of proof required to establish a compensable
coronary injury."' Disregarding the dicta in Dwyer, stating the
irrelevancy of duplicating work strain in ordinary home activity,
the Hellwig court held that ordinary work effort is sufficient to
establish causation for a compensable coronary accident." 2 The
court interpreted the statutory language as focusing on the intensity and duration of the work strain prior to the accident and
Id. at 42, 538 A.2d at 1246.
Id. at 48-51, 538 A.2d at 1250-51.
104 Id. at 48, 538 A.2d at 1250 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2). The
supreme court noted that the appellate division in Prusecki applied this same reasoning in denying benefits to the claimant. Id.
105 Id. at 49, 538 A.2d at 1250.
106 Id. at 40, 538 A.2d at 1245 (quoting 215 N.J. Super. 247, 521 A.2d 896).
107 Id.
108 Id.at 54, 538 A.2d at 1253.
109 Id. at 49, 538 A.2d at 1250.
'to Id. at 49, 538 A.2d at 1250 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-7.2) (emphasis in
original). In Dwyer, the court defined material degree as "an appreciable degree or
a degree substantially greater than de minimis." 36 N.J. at 493, 178 A.2d at 164.
11 Hellwig, 110 N.J. at 49, 538 A.2d at 1250-51.
112 Id. at 50, 538 A.2d at 1251.
102
103
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evaluating its probability of causing cardiac dysfunction."3
Thus, if a heart attack occurs at the culmination of a period of
ordinary work effort, it may be compensable under the Statute."t 4
The court concluded that the legislature intended that the work
strain be measured against the claimant's daily living and routine
activity exclusive of work." 5
Further, the court noted the new statutory test requires that
the work effort involve a substantial event or happening that
caused, in a material degree, the heart failure." 6 The Hellwig
court, realizing the inevitable problem of medical certainty in establishing causation in these cardiac cases, noted the need for
greater agreement in the medical community for standards to determine the causal link between cardiac dysfunction and work

effort.' '
In an effort to establish fixed standards, the supreme court in
Heliwig cited the suggested guidelines noted by the 1977 American Heart Association's Committee on Stress, Strain and Heart
Disease.'18 The court utilized these guidelines to support its
conclusion that the claimant in Heliwig suffered a heart attack as a
result of his work stress and strain.' '9 The court determined that
113 Id. at 50, 538 A.2d at 1251.

Id. at 51, 538 A.2d at 1251.
Id. at 54, 538 A.2d at 1253. The court also noted that the worker's medical
history should be taken into account as well as the precipitating work effort and the
length of time between the work effort and the attack. Id. See also American Heart
Association's Committee on Stress, Strain and Heart Disease, Circulation, 55:825A,
826A (1977) (which suggests guidelines for determining the causal relation between occupational and non-occupational stresses and heart disease).
116 Hellwig, 110 N.J. at 39, 538 A.2d at 1244 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2).
117 HelUwig, 110 N.J. at 52, 538 A.2d at 1252. In Hellwig, Prusecki, and Dwyer, the
medical experts disagreed as to the cause of the heart attack and the compensation
judges were forced to choose between conflicting testimony. Hellwig, 110 N.J. at
51, 538 A.2d at 1251; Dwyer, 36 N.J. at 513-14, 178 A.2d at 174-75; Prusecki, 206
N.J. Super. at 43-44, 501 A.2d at 1010-11. Inevitably, the court recognized that
compensation judges will evaluate conflicting expert testimony. Hellwig, 110 N.J. at
51, 538 A.2d at 1251. Providing guidelines to establish causal links between stress
and injury, the court noted, would be a significant aid to these judges. Id. The
Hellwig court also stressed that compensation judges are under a duty to be informed of the contemporary medical standards so that they may evaluate conclusory expert testimony. Id.
118 Id. at 52, 538 A.2d at 1253. The court noted that the committee's report
concluded that medical science cannot determine when a person with underlying
heart disease will suffer a heart attack without analyzing the stress of work effort,
physical stress of sufficient duration and intensity may trigger a heart attack, and
the causal link between work effort and injury is directly related to the time span
between the precipitating event and the injury. Id. at 53-54, 538 A.2d at 1253.
119 Id. at 54, 538 A.2d at 1253. The court set forth that an evaluation of any
coronary claim should include an account of the claimant's medical history, the
114
115
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the claimant had no history of heart disease, there was a sufficient
magnitude of work strain, and only a short period had elapsed
between the work effort and his myocardial infarction. 120 Thus,
the court concluded that the injury was compensable.' 2 ' The
court opined that the legislature, in amending the Workers'
Compensation Act, sought to modify the Dwyer standard and require more reliable proof of a causal connection between work
strain and cardiac dysfunction. 12 2 Courts now require that the
claimant prove by a preponderance of credible evidence that the
work effort exceed that stress normally encountered during routine home activity. 123 The court stated that no standards had yet
been established to measure the equivalents of routine work
stress with that of physical activity outside of work. 124 Inevitably,
medical experts hired by opposing parties will have different
opinions on this subject as well as the causal link between work
stress and heart disease. 25 Thus, the New Jersey Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 34:15-7.2 of the New Jersey
Statutes in Heliwig does little to clarify the stress and strain required to compensate coronary injury.
By their interpretation of the Statute, the Heliwig court seems
to be opening the floodgates for workers' compensation claims,
because in most coronary injury cases the claimant's physical
stress at work exceeds the stress in his leisure time. In holding
that ordinary work effort may lead to a compensable injury, and
duration and intensity of the work effort preceding the accident and the time lag
between the work strain and the cardiac disfunction. Id. at 52-53, 538 A.2d at
1252-53 n.3.
120 Id. at 55, 538 A.2d at 1253.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 54, 538 A.2d at 1253. The court reasoned that the legislature's choice
of language in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2: "substantial condition, event or happening," together with its redefinition of material degree, as well as the requirement of causation between work effort and injury, all indicate an enhancement of
the Dwyer standards. Id.
123 Hellwig, at 51, 538 A.2d at 1251. Thus, in the case of a recreational jogger, his
work strain could be compared with his running. Id. at 48, 538 A.2d at 1250.
124 Id. at 52, 538 A.2d at 1252. The court stated that this problem was recognized by Chief Justice Weintraub in his concurring opinion in Dwyer. Id. (citing
Dwyer, 36 N.J. 487, 513, 178 A.2d 161, 174 (Weintraub, C.J. concurring)). Chief
Justice Weintraub noted that in heart matters, conflicting theses plague the medical
profession as to "(1) whether stress or strain can precipitate certain disabling injuries or worsen them, and (2) what criteria must be met to establish medically a causal
connection when it is agreed that stress and strain can be a factor." Dwyer, 36 N.J.
487, 513, 178 A.2d 161, 174 (Weintraub, C.J. concurring). Thus, inevitably judges
are pressed to choose between conflicting medical testimony. Id. at 514, 178 A.2d
at 175 (Weintraub, CJ. concurring).
125
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abandoning the unusual strain rule of Seiken, the court has provided that any accident, occurring while on the job, is compensable if it is medically possible that the work effort may have
contributed to the injury. Therefore, a claimant can meet his
burden of proof by simply introducing favorable expert testimony. Compensation will be granted unless the judge finds
counter-testimony more compelling.
The new Statute calls for work effort contributing in some
material degree-a degree substantially greater than de
minimis. 12 6 It seems unlikely that this change in proof from the
Dwyer standard will have any real impact because of the uncertainty in establishing a causal link between work effort and heart
disease. 12 7 What one expert might determine contributed to a
coronary accident, another might not. Thus, the increased standard of proof has little significance in the larger scheme of workers' compensation cases. While the Heliwig court relied on the
American Heart Association's report on stress and strain, those
guidelines are sure to change in accordance with the constant
leaps and bounds made in the medical field. It appears the
supreme court, however, affirmed the compensation judge's
award of benefits in Hellwig not only because of the magnitude of
the work effort, but also because of the short interval between the
28
work effort and decedent's loss of consciousness.
The problem with this interpretation of the Statute is that
judges will inevitably be forced to determine which medical experts are more convincing and decide claims solely on this basis.
Until there is more agreement in the medical field on the causal
link between stress and heart disease, however, there appears to
be no alternate method of deciding workers' compensation
claims. Thus, compensation judges have great discretion in
awarding benefits.
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of the Statute seems to be in accordance with its legislative
intent of "putting significantly more money into the hands of the
more seriously injured workers .... 129 The 1979 amendment
to the Workers' Compensation Statute primarily sought to assist
those blue collar workers who typically live from paycheck to
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2.
See Hellwig, 110 N.J. at 52, 538 A.2d 1243, and Dwyer, 36 N.J. 487, 513, 178
A.2d 161, 174 (concurring and dissenting opinions).
128 See Hellwig, 110 N.J. at 54, 538 A.2d at 1253.
129 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 29.
126
127
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paycheck by providing benefits for their widows and children.
The cases that follow from Hellwig are likely to fulfill this legislative intent.
Anne M. Dalena

